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Abstract
This Perspective explores the reality behind the headlines as well as more recent efforts to
improve the situation. By examining legal developments and analyzing the obstacles to enforce-
ment, this Perspective will highlight how the issues are largely symptomatic of a developing legal
system–a system struggling to translate theory into practice as it attempts to bridge the gap be-
tween traditional Chinese and Western expectations of adjudication. Part I outlines the history
and background of arbitration in China, while Part II considers the current state of the law, with
a particular focus on recent legislative developments. Part III examines the institutional features
of the legal and political system that present the greatest obstacles to the enforcement of arbitra-
tion awards. Part IV identifies those areas most in need of change that are both substantive and
institutional in nature. Finally, Part V examines the key expectations of, and on, the system, and
whether China may be defying what many perceive as the usual correlation between foreign direct
investment and the rule of law, before drawing final conclusions.
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INTRODUCTION
Recently characterized by the New York Times as the "Chi-
nese legal netherworld"' and by the former CEO of a major oil
company as "a black hole,"2 China's reputation for its enforce-
ment of arbitration awards leaves much to be desired.' Yet, in
spite of headlines such as these, China remains the world's most
attractive destination for foreign direct investment ("FDI").'
This Perspective explores the reality behind the headlines as
well as more recent efforts to improve the situation.5 By examin-
ing legal developments and analyzing the obstacles to enforce-
* Fordham Law School, LL.M. Candidate 2007.
1. Joseph Kahn, Dispute Leaves U.S. Executive in the Chinese Legal Netherworld, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2005, at Al (reporting U.S. business executive deprived of liberty in
P.R.C. and coerced into signing documents transferring property).
2. Gary Gentile, China Will Someday Buy US Energy Company, Ex-UNOCAL Boss Says.
Contract Enforceability and Competition Questions Remain Major Hurdles, WIKs-BARRE
TIMES LEADER (PA), Oct. 14, 2005, at C3 (citing former UNOCAL Corp. CEO Charles
R. Williamson's position on conditions U.S. party insisted on in transaction with Chi-
nese party to avoid arbitrating in China).
3. See generally No Dispute About It, ECON. INTELLIGENCE UNIT (Bus. China), Apr. 24,
2006 (noting that many Western business memoirs are packed with horror stories about
colluding judges and unenforceable court decisions).
4. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT ("UNCTAD"), PROSPECTS
FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE STRATEGIES OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORA-
TIONS: 2005-2008 (Dec. 2005) http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20057en.pdf
(last visited May 13, 2007); see also Press release, UNCTAD, New UNCTAD Surveys:
Foreign Direct Investment Prospects Promising For 2005-2008, UNCTAD/PRESS/PR/
2005/031 (Sept. 05, 2005) [hereinafter UNCTAD Press Release], http://www.unctad.
org/templates/webflyer.asp?docid=6301&inttemID=1528&lang=l (last visited Apr. 16,
2007). UNCTAD reports that eighty-seven percent of multinationals and eighty-five
percent of experts it surveyed in 2005 ranked China the world's most attractive place to
do business-at least thirty percent more than for the next best performer. See
UNCTAD Press Release, supra.
5. The scope of this Perspectiveis limited to commercial arbitration awards. The
difficulties of receiving recognition of an arbitration clause, while a preliminary and
sizeable obstacle to enforcement, are not considered. Furthermore, this Perspective
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ment, this Perspective will highlight how the issues are largely
symptomatic of a developing legal system-a system struggling to
translate theory into practice as it attempts to bridge the gap
between traditional Chinese and Western expectations of adjudi-
cation.6 Part I outlines the history and background of arbitra-
tion in China, while Part II considers the current state of the law,
with a particular focus on recent legislative developments. Part
III examines the institutional features of the legal and political
system that present the greatest obstacles to the enforcement of
arbitration awards. Part IV identifies those areas most in need of
change that are both substantive and institutional in nature. Fi-
nally, Part V examines the key expectations of, and on, the sys-
tem, and whether China may be defying what many perceive as
the usual correlation between foreign direct investment and the
rule of law, before drawing final conclusions.7
I. ARBITRATION IN CHINA
With its roots in Confucian philosophy, based on "Ii," princi-
ples of natural order and harmony,' mediation has been used
for thousands of years to resolve disputes in China.9 "Fa," or
man-made law in the Western sense, was not used in ancient
China as a means of preserving rights, freedom, and justice, as
these were alien concepts.'0 This preference for non-adversarial
dispute resolution underlies the extensive use of mediation in
does not consider enforcement actions against State entities or actions involving the
more politically sensitive matters of democracy and human rights.
6. See infra pt. III.
7. See generally Benedict Sheehy, Fundamentally Conflicting Views of the Rule of Law in
China and the West & Implications for Commercial Disputes,26 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 225
(2006).
8. Id. at 242.
9. Arbitration Law of the P.R.C., art. 50 (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat'l
People's Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Arbitration Law],
translated in ARBITRATION LAWS OF CHINA (Legislative Affairs Commission of the Stand-
ing Comm. of the Nat. People's Cong. of P.R.C. eds., 1997). Mediation and arbitration
are given equal recognition and awards from the two processes given the same effect in
P.R.C. law. Id.
10. See Liang Zhiping, Explicating "Law": A Comparative Perspective of Chinese and
Western Legal Culture, 3 J. CHINESE L. 55, 57(1989); see also Carlos de Vera, Arbitrating
Harmony: "Med-Arb" and the Confluence of Culture and Rule of Law in the Resolution of Inter-
national Commercial Disputes in China, 18 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 149, 153 (2004) (analyzing
how arbitration is much more adversarial in its proceedings than mediation); accord
Sheehy, supra note 7, at 241.
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both ancient and contemporary China. t" Before the reform of
the Civil Procedure Law ("CPL") in 1991, under the principle of
"mediation first, trial second," courts were obliged to attempt
resolution through mediation before resorting to the courts.12
Chinese courts still mediate disputes before delivering judg-
ments," and also sometimes mediate during the arbitration pro-
cess. 4 Furthermore, the courts regard arbitration and media-
tion awards equally for the purposes of recognition and enforce-
ment.
15
The Chinese formally adopted "arbitration" in the early
twentieth century as Western-style legislation was introduced
into the country following the downfall of the Qing Dynasty in
1910.16 Arbitration does not fit easily with the traditional chan-
nels of resolution; it is very much a foreign import that the indig-
enous jurisprudence is taking time to adjust to. 7 Notwithstand-
ing a continued suspicion that the international arbitration
tribunals are dominated by the will and demands of the big capi-
talist powers, arbitration is an increasingly popular mechanism
11. See JOHN SHIJIAN Mo, ARBITRATION LAW IN CHINA 1 (2001). The art of "lijie,"
maintaining composure and remaining polite and courteous, is a strong cultural factor
that results in the preference for mediation. Before the twentieth century, there was
only a word for mediation in Chinese and no distinction was made between mediation
and what is now termed "arbitration." Id.
12. See Civil Procedure Law of the P.R.C., art. 195(a) (for Trial Implementation)
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 8, 1982, repealed
Apr. 9, 1991) [hereinafter CPL 1982], translated in ISINOLAW (P.R.C.), repealed by Civil
Procedure Law of the P.R.C. (adopted by the 7th Nat'l People's Cong., effective Apr. 9,
1991), art. 9 [hereinafter CPL 1991], translated in WEI Luo, THE CMvlL PROCEDURE LAW
AND PROCEDURE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 38 (2006); see also Mo, supra note
11, at 13-14 (describing how, before 1982, courts focused their efforts on mediation of
disputes under Article 6 of CPL 1982).
13. See CPL 1991, art. 9. Court-annexed mediation is regulated by CPL 1991, arts.
9, 85-91, and 155. See Mo, supra note 11, at 4.
14. See Arbitration Law, arts. 5, 51 (provision for a voluntary conciliation process);
see also Mo, supra note 11, at 4.
15. See Arbitration Law, art. 89; see also Opinions of the Sup. People's Ct. on Sev-
eral Issues Regarding the Application of Civil Procedure Law (P.R.C.), (adopted by Adj.
Comm. of the Supreme People's Ct., promulgated July 14, 1992), art. 310 [hereinafter
1992 SPC Civil Procedure Opinion], translated in Luo, supra note 12, 137. Mediation is
non-binding, but a settlement agreement can be converted into a binding arbitral
award through the issuance of a consent award. Id.
16. Mo, supra note 11, at 1.
17. No Dispute About It, supra note 3 ("Arbitration is a foreign institution and comes
with its own culture, its own ideals and ways of thinking," quoting Wang Hongson, Head
Secretary of the Beijing Arbitration Commission (" BAC")).
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for resolving commercial disputes."8 Both domestic and foreign
investors perceive arbitration as preferable to litigating in what
are perceived as corrupt courts and further, as a means of poten-
tially having greater input on the outcome.' 9
The first formal arbitration system for resolving commercial
disputes with foreign parties was set up shortly after Communist
China was established.20 Prime Minister Zhou En Lai requested
the establishment of an arbitration system, primarily as an ac-
knowledgement of the inadequacy of the court system for set-
tling commercial disputes.2' That system has ultimately evolved
into the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission ("CIETAC") .22 Together with the China Maritime
Arbitration Commission ("CMAC"), CIETAC is one of the
world's busiest arbitration forums. 23 Subsequent to the Arbitra-
tion Law in 1994, more than 140 other arbitration centers have
been established in large and medium-sized cities throughout
the country.2 4 Most foreign parties forced to arbitrate within
China still choose CIETAC, which has tried hard to bring its
rules in line with international standards, 25 although the Beijing
18. See Sheehy, supra note 7, at 225; see also An Chen, Is Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards an Issue for Consideration and Improvement?-The Case of China, Presentation at the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") Symposium:
Making the Most of International Investment Agreements: A Common Agenda (Dec.
12, 2005), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/40/36054525.pdf (last visited Apr. 16,
2007) (observing possible fear of reoccurrence of "consular jurisdiction" system im-
posed in 1840 by Western imperialist powers after China's defeat in "Opium Wars,"
through which China was deprived of power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over her
own territory).
19. Sheehy, supra note 7, at 225.
20. SeeJINGZHAO TAO, ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN CHINA 7 (2004). The first
provision for foreign-related arbitration was in the Protocol for General Conditions of
Delivery of Goods Signed by China and Russian in April 1950. See Jian Zhou, Judicial
Intervention in International Arbitration: A Comparative Study of the Scope of the New York
Convention in U.S. and Chinese Courts, 15 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'v 403, 446 (2006).
21. See TAO, supra note 20, at 7.
22. See generally id. at 17-32.
23. SeeNo Dispute About It, supra note 3 (China International Economic and Trade
Arbitration Commission ("CIETAC") processed over 800 cases involving foreign part-
ners in 2005, the largest international caseload in the world.).
24. Arbitration Law, arts. 10-15 (allowing creation of arbitration commissions in
Central Government Municipalities and cities that are the seats of the people's govern-
ments of provinces or autonomous regions).
25. See Randall Peerenboom, The Evolving Regulatory Framework for Enforcement of
Arbitral Awards in The People's Republic of China, 1 AStAN-PAC. L. & POL'vJ. 1, 6 (2000)
(outlining development of CIETAC). For example, in 2005, CIETAC introduced re-
vised rules and procedures focusing on promoting the autonomous nature of interna-
20071 1321
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Arbitration Commission is also attracting attention for its ethical
practices. 2 6
Commercial arbitration is big business and increasingly
competitive. 27 The profitability and prestige of the foreign-re-
lated arbitration commissions plays a large part in inducing do-
mestic institutions to reform.2 In the meantime, foreign arbitra-
tion commissions, such as the International Court of Arbitration
of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris("ICC"), are
still prohibited from adjudicating in China. 9
A. The Court System
China has approximately 3,500 courts of general jurisdic-
tion and various specialized courts, with a career-judiciary system
of roughly 106,000 judges and 52,000 assistant judges.30 There
are four levels of courts: one Supreme People's Court ("SPC")
in Beijing; thirty Higher Level People's Courts ("HPC"), one for
each province or autonomous region and centrally-administered
city; 389 Intermediate People's Courts ("IPC"); and the Basic
Level People's Courts ("BPC") .3 Nearly half of all civilian dis-
putes, however, are still settled in local "People's Conciliation
Committees. '3 2 Not only is there a cultural preference for medi-
tional arbitration. See Peter Thorp, New Arbitration Rules Welcomed, FIN. TIMES (Asia),
Aug. 31, 2005.
26. No Dispute About it, supra note 3 ("The Beijing Arbitration Commission is the
only local arbitration commission which meets or surpasses global standards.").
27. See Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 12-13.
28. See id.
29. See generally Michael Moser, Investing in China: No Good Tidings For ICC. The
International Chamber of Commerce Wants Access to Mainland For Its Court, FIN. TIMES (ASIA),
Dec. 21, 2005; Kim Rooney, Legal View: Hong Kong May Harbor Solution, FIN. TIMES (On-
line), Dec. 5, 2006 (discussing how current Chinese law effectively bars foreign parties
from conducting arbitration with mainland Chinese parties within the country under
rule of international arbitration institutions).
30. Donald Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese Court Systems: The Enforcement of
Civil Judgments, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 6 (1996).
31. Id. There are also specialized Military, Maritime and Railway Courts. There
appears to be no exact number of BPC available as they can be more geographically
spread and informal in nature.
32. Luo, supra note 12, 13-14. Many individual disputes are still settled in local
"People's Conciliation Committees," established in 1954. In 1989, there were 1,006,040
Peoples' Conciliation Committees and 5,937,110 people's mediators in China. In 2002,
4,636,139 civilian disputes were settled by such Committees versus 4,393,306 civil and
commercial dispute combined adjudicated by the courts. See id. at 115 (citing The Statis-
tical Table of 2002 Civilian Dispute Mediation, in LAw YEARBooK OF CHINA (2003)).
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ation, but the Chinese people do not readily resort to their
courts to resolve disputes.
Each court is internally organized into several departments,
all under the general authority of the Adjudication Committee
and the court president.33 These might include an adjudicatory
chamber (ting), criminal chamber, civil chamber, and an admin-
istrative chamber. 4 The enforcement of judgments is generally
the responsibility of an execution chamber (zhixing ting) ." Even
if a court does not have a specific chamber, the law requires that
at a minimum it include officials responsible for enforcing judg-
ments.36 These officials are assisted by court police (fajing), who
do not have the same authority as regular police but who are
instrumental in enforcing awards.37
Notably, each Court is responsible to the People's Congress
at the equivalent level, which supervises its work and handles the
appointment and removal of judges.38 Furthermore, the local
government pays their wages and provides housing.39 Such de-
pendence impairs both the financial and ideological indepen-
dence of judges.4"
II. LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
Although it is not easy to discern, Chinese law does have a
discernable legislative hierarchy.41 As a "People's Republic," the
ultimate authority is the Peoples' Congress, which is the source
of authority for the Constitution of P.R.C., and promulgations by
the National Peoples' Congress ("NPC") and its Standing Com-
mittee, which are superior to regulations and laws made by the
State Council and government authority.4 2 Provincial laws and
33. Clarke, supra note 30, at 12 (describing the court structure).
34. Id.
35. Id. (Enforcement Chamber).
36. CPL 1991, art. 209 (enforcement officers); see also Clarke, supra note 30, at 13.
37. CPL 1991, art. 209 (outlining role of the enforcement police).
38. See Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 8.
39. Id.
40. Id. (outlining the institutional reasons for local protectionism in the judiciary).
41. Mo, supra note 11, at 31-32 (outlining legislative hierarchy).
42. Id. The most recent promulgation was December 4, 1982. The constitution's
First Amendment was approved on April 12, 1988. The Second Amendment was ap-
proved on March 29, 1993. The Third Amendment was approved on March 15, 1999.
The Fourth Amendment was approved on March 14, 2004. See generally Xian Fa [Consti-
tution], (1982) (P.R.C.) (adopted on Dec. 2, 1982, First Amendment by the 7th Nat'l
People's Conf., Apr. 12, 1988; and Second Amendment by the 8th Nat'l People's Conf.,
2007] 1323
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local regulations are technically subject to these three national
authorities. Absent the doctrine of stare decisis, the SPC has the
power to issue judicial interpretations of the law, replies, notices
or directives.44 Only the SPC has the power to formally interpret
laws and, with that power, the Court has played a critical role in
the development of China's arbitration laws.45
The laws on recognizing and enforcing arbitral awards have
been developed relatively expeditiously.46 Twenty-five years ago,
no law existed for either recognition or enforcement of foreign
or foreign-related awards.4 7 The Civil Procedure Law in 1982
was the first such law.4 8 Among its numerous shortcomings was
the lack of clarification on the status of ad hoc awards: there was
no provision on refusal to enforce an award nor indeed any pro-
vision for the judgment review at all.49 Not surprisingly, per-
haps, five years later there had been no recorded case of a suc-
cessful enforcement of a foreign arbitral award.50 Fortunately,
the 1982 Civil Procedure law was subsequently repealed and re-
placed by the 1991 revision, which does contain a number of
provisions addressing the enforcement of awards.5' This law was
further supplemented by a comprehensive SPC interpretation in
Mar. 29, 1993) available at http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitu-
tion.html.
43. See Mo, supra note 11, at 32-33.
44. Id. at 37 (explaining the role and status ofjudicial interpretations).
45. Id. More than forty judicial interpretations have been issued since 1949, about
half of them after 1994. The National Procuratorate also has power to interpret na-
tional laws but had not interpreted any law related to arbitration as of 2001. Id.
46. See Clarke, supra note 30, at 17 n.67 (listing judicial interpretations illustrating
activity).
47. Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 13 ("Such awards were considered self-execut-
ing and depended on voluntary compliance by the losing party. Similarly, parties seek-
ing to enforce foreign awards were forced to rely primarily on voluntary compliance,
although they could seek administrative assistance from government bodies such as
CCPIT."); see Andrew Kui-Nung Cheung, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, 34 AM.J. COMP. L. 295, 297 (1986). But cf Clarke, supra note 30,
at 17-18 (noting that a 1956 speech by the then president of the Jiangsu Higher Level
People's Court showed that many of the techniques in the 1982 and 1991 Civil Proce-
dure Laws may have been in use from the 1950s).
48. See Cheung, supra note 47, at 296-97.
49. See Peerenboom, supra note 25, atl4 (highlighting weaknesses and omissions
in the 1982 CPL).
50. See id. at 15; see also Clarke, supra note 30, at 15 (noting that problems with
execution were partly behind the CPL 1991 Revisions).
51. See CPL 1982; see also CPL 1991, at 132-35.
2007] COMMERCIAL ARBITRAL AWARDS 1325
1992.52
In the meantime, China acceded to the New York Conven-
tion in January 1987 instigating major changes in arbitration
law.53 Its ratification was heralded as a deliberate step to en-
courage foreign investment into the country.54 As an interna-
tional convention, it was directly applicable and superior to any
conflicting domestic laws or regulations.55 The Convention was,
however, received suspiciously, perceived as a product of the
Western, industrialized system with a presumed inherent bias
against the interests of the developing and socialist countries. 6
Much of that suspicion still remains. 7
Since 1987, there has been a flurry of laws and SPC regula-
tions in this area, including the 1991 revisions to the CPL.58
This legislative and judicial activism is indicative of the govern-
ment's commitment to reform in the enforcement of civil judge-
ments, including arbitration awards. 5' The 1994 Arbitration
Law6" passed by the NPC now ranks highest in the legal frame-
52. See 1992 SPC Civil Procedure Opinion, at 222-26.
53. New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 [hereinafter New York
Convention]. China signed with two reservations: a reservation on reciprocity and a
second reservation restricting its applicability to "commercial" arbitration awards.
While the English language version of the reciprocity reservation is identical to the
Convention, the Chinese language version is said to be much tighter and more restric-
tive in limiting recognition to arbitral awards made "within the territory of another
contracting country." Chinese courts and scholars have interpreted this to mean that
the Convention does not extend to domestic awards. See Zhou, supra note 20, at 44243.
54. See China to Ratify Convention on Foreign Arbitration, XINHUA GENERAL OVERSEAS
NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 27, 1986, Then Premier Zhao Ziyang told the Standing Committee
of the National People's Congress that: "The ratification of the Convention ... is
aimed at meeting the demands of implementing the policy of opening China to eco-
nomic cooperation with foreign countries and facilitating the country's foreign trade."
Bruce R. Schulberg, China's Accession to the New York Convention: An Analysis of the New
Regime of Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 J. CHINESE L. 117, 117
(1989).
55. CPL 1991, at 124.
56. See Schulberg, supranote 54, at 125-26 (rationalizing China's reluctance to join
the Convention); see also Chen, supra note 18.
57. See No Dispute About it, supra note 3 ("Arbitration is a foreign institution and
comes with its own culture, its own ideals and ways of thinking," quoting Wang Hong-
son, Head Secretary of the Beijing Arbitration Commission).
58. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
59. See Clarke, supra note 30, at 17 n.67 (listing the Supreme People's Court and
the Ministry ofJustice notices and decrees dealing with specific problems of execution).
60. See generally Arbitration Law, supra note 9.
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work for commercial arbitration in China.6 This law consoli-
dated all commercial arbitration and allowed for establishment
of arbitration centers independent of the government, in keep-
ing with the transition from a centrally planned economy to a
more market-oriented one.62 The monopoly of CIETAC and
CMAC over foreign-related commercial disputes was thereby
abolished, allowing for the large number of forums and commis-
sions that now exist.
63
Currently the law governing the enforcement of commer-
cial arbitration stems from three main sources: international
conventions,6 4 international bilateral agreements, and domestic
law.65 In addition to the Arbitration Law 1994, the principal do-
mestic laws are found in the 1991 Civil Procedure Law and a
number of subsequent SPC interpretations, the principal fea-
tures of which are discussed infra.6 6 Which of these multifarious
laws are applied in a particular case hinges on the type of award
being petitioned for recognition and enforcement.
A. Types of Award
A key feature of the law applicable to the enforcement of
arbitration awards in China is the trifurcated classification of
awards, depending on their origin.6 7 This is a departure from
the binary domestic and non-domestic terminology of the New
61. Mo, supra note 41, at 34. The legislative authority of codes is not always easy to
determine; the Arbitration Law 1994 ranks lower than the Constitution of 1982, but by
virtue of its NPC promulgation, higher that any regulations made by the State Council
and local legislature. This is particularly relevant as there aremany local laws that con-
flict with provisions of the Arbitration Law 1994. Id. at 33-34.
62. See Arbitration Law, at 4.
63. Id.
64. In addition to the New York Convention, China is party to Washington Con-
vention on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards rendered by tribunals es-
tablished within the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Dispute
("ICSID"). See Clarke, supra note 30, at 15.
65. See TAo, supra note 20, at 131-79 (outlining the laws on enforcement of arbitral
awards in China); see also Chen, supra note 18.
66. See Arbitration Law; see also CPL 1991. The CPL 1991 contained a number of
new provisions,including Article 217 (substantive review of domestic awards) and Arti-
cle 260 (foreign-related awards). See generally Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 16-17.
67. Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 11; see also TAO, supra note 20, 131 (outlining
the importance of the distinction). This trifurcation pertains only to the laws of en-
forcement. Arbitration Law and procedure within China has two categories, domestic
and foreign-related arbitration. See TAO, supra note 20, at 89, 131.
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York Convention. 68 Chinese law distinguishes between "foreign"
awards, made outside of mainland China, "foreign-related"
awards, and domestic awards. 69 The distinction is a crucial one
with important consequences.7 0 It is particularly relevant to for-
eign investment vehicles, which are surprisingly found subject to
compulsory Chinese jurisdiction.7'
Foreign awards are effectively classified as Convention or
non-Convention awards, again depending on the origin of the
award. 72 Foreign-related awards, however, are those issued by
Chinese arbitration institutions, such as CIETAC, CMAC, or lo-
cal arbitration commissions involving an extranational element
or party.73 As is discussed infra, the grounds for refusing to en-
force Convention and foreign-related awards are primarily lim-
ited to procedural grounds, whereas domestic awards can be sub-
ject to substantive review.7 ' Regardless of its orgin and clas-
sificiation, the first step to enforcement of the award is its
recognition by the courts.
1. Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards
Shortly after China signed the New York Convention, the
68. See generally Zhou, supra note 20, at 443-52.
69. Peerenboom, supra note 27, at 11 (foreign-related awards are those involving a
foreign element).
70. See TAO, supra note 20, at 131.
71. See infra note 98 and accompanying text (compulsory jurisdiction for wholly-
owned foreign enterprises and joint ventures).
72. Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 11. This Perspective only deals with foreign
awards made in countries that have ratified the Convention, referred to throughout as
"Convention awards." Although it is technically possible to enforce an award from a
non-Convention country under Civil Procedure Law, Article 269, it would only be
under strict principles of reciprocity. In practice it would not only be difficult to obtain
enforcement, but, as there are 142 parties to the New York Convention,including
China's main trading partners, it is not likely to arise. See id. at 27; see also U.N. Commis-
sion on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"), Status: 1958-Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, http://www.uncitral.org/un-
citral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/NYConventionstatus.html (last visited Feb. 19,
2007).
73. Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 11. Foreign-related and domestic awards are
separately identified in the Arbitration Law 1994, but it does not provide definitions.
Instead, there is a 1991 SPC interpretation that states a case is a foreign-related one if:
(1) one or both parties are foreign nationals, stateless persons, or foreign companies or
organizations; (2) the legal actions leading to formation, change or termination of the
legal relationship occurred in a foreign country; or (3) the subject matter of the dispute
is located in a foreign country. See 1992 SPC Civil Procedure Opinion, at 222.
74. See Zhou, supra note 20, at 447; see also CPL 1991, art. 217.
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SPC issued an interpretation aimed at smoothing its implemen-
tation, calling on judicial personnel to study the Convention
and comply with it practically.7 5 It also clarified issues on the
commercial reservation, venue, and time limits.7 6
The grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement of
foreign awards derive directly from Article 5 of the Convention
and are primarily confined to procedural criteria.77 As in many
jurisdictions, the most controversial ground for refusal is that
the award is ruled to be against "public policy."7 This can be
vulnerable to abuse by protectionist concerns.7 9 Although diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to define, "public policy" under the Con-
vention is generally limited to violation of a State's "international
public policy."' U.S. courts have held this defense applies only
when "enforcement would violate the forum state's most basic
notions of morality and justice."'" The Chinese courts appear,
however, to have interpreted it more broadly.8 2
2. Recognition of Foreign-Related Awards
The provisions of the Civil Procedure Law 1991 and Arbitra-
tion Law 1994 applicable to foreign-related awards closely resem-
75. Notice of the Supreme People's Court on the Implementation of the Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, to Which This
Country Has Become Party, pmbl. (promulgated by the SPC on Apr. 10, 1987), trans-
lated in ISINOLAW (last visited Feb. 18, 2007) (P.R.C.).
76. See id.; see also Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 15-16 (outlining goals of the 1992
notice). The Convention does not apply to mediation awards.
77. Zhou, supra note 20, at 445-46. Article V stipulates limited grounds for
grounds to invoke court refusal to enforce. Five grounds can be summarized as follows:
(1) incapacity of the parties or invalidity of the agreement; (2) insufficient notice or
unfair deprivation of procedural rights; (3) disputed issue beyond the agreed scope of
submission; (4) improper arbitral procedures or tribunal; and (5) non-binding awards.
Also if subject matter "is not capable of being settled by arbitration" or the enforcement
would be against public policy. Id.
78. See id. at 448.
79. See generally Yongping Xiao & Zhengxin Huo, Ordre Public In China's Private
International Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 653, 668-69 (2005).
80. Id. (French Nouveau Code de Prochdure Civile [N.C.P.C.], arts. 1498 and 1501
regulated the international public policy and have been influential around the world);
see Zhou, supra note 20, at 449 (elucidating why "public interest" is broader than "pub-
lic policy").
81. See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe General de L'industrie du
Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974).
82. See Zhou, supra note 20, at 449.
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ble the New York Convention.83 There are four independent
grounds a defendant may invoke against a petitioner for recogni-
tion 4 and enforcement of a foreign-related arbitral award, re-
peated and reinforced by the Arbitration Law 1994."5
Far more controversially, in contrast to grounds of "public
policy" in the Convention, Chinese courts may deny recognition
and enforcement to foreign-related awards on grounds of "pub-
lic interest." 6 This concept of "public interest" has been applied
much more broadly than "public policy."8 7 According to one
commentator, the term "public interest" is unique to Chinese
Law and "may include any financial, cultural, environmental, or
other interest as long as it is public, and not isolated to a small
group." 8 Adding to the confusion, the concept is only found in
the CPL 1991 and not in the hierarchically superior Arbitration
Law 1994.89
In Dongfeng Garments Factory of Kai Feng City & Tai Chun Int'l
Trade (HK) Co. Lt. v. Henan Garments Imp. & Exp. (Group) Co.,9°
the Zhengzhou IPC refused to enforce a CIETAC award simply
because it was not in China's economic interests.9" The SPC
overturned this ruling in adjudication but regrettably failed to
83. See Arbitration Law, arts. 65-73; CPL 1991, arts. 237-42; see also New York Con-
vention, supra note 53.
84. See CPL 1991, art. 260. These four criteria are: (1) no written arbitration
agreement exists; (2) notice was insufficient or procedural rights were unfairly de-
prived; (3) the arbitral procedure or tribunal was improper; and (4) the disputed issues
were beyond the agreed upon scope of arbitration or the subject matter was not capable
of settlement by arbitration.
85. Arbitration Law, art. 71.
86. See Arbitration Law, art. 71; see also, CPL 1991, art. 260 (stating that: "If a
people's court determines that the enforcement of an award will violate the social and
public interest") (emphasis added).
87. See ZHOU, supra note 20, at 44849.
88. Id. at 449 (theorizing on possible violations of social public interest resulting in
the refusal of enforcing arbitral awards, including: "[T]he violation of sovereignty,
damage to natural resources, serious contamination to the environment, threat to pub-
lic health or safety, or corruption of morality," citing Hu Li, ENFORCEMENT OF THE IN-
TERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AWARD: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE EN-
FORCEMENT OF THE ARBITRAL AWARD IN THE P.R. CHINA 148 (2000)).
89. See Zhou, supra note 20, at 446. It is not known why the Arbitration Law 1994
does not contain the "public interest" ground, but, regardless, the CPL still provides
legal basis for refusal to enforce. See CPL 1991, supra note 12, art. 260.
90. See Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 38 n.165 (discussing Dong/eng Garments Fac-
tory of Kai Feng City andTai Chunlnt'l Trade (HK) Co. Ltd.v. Henan Garments Imp. & Exp.
(Group) Co. (Zhengzhou Interm. People's Ct., Sept. 28, 1992)).
91. See Xiao & Huo, supra note 79, at 668-69.
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further define "public interest" nor relate it to the international
"public policy" standard of the Convention.9 2 While the courts
treat Foreign-related awards with less deference than Conven-
tion awards, it is domestic awards that are most open to the
Court's discretion through de novo review.
3. Domestic Awards
Article 217 of the CPL outlines the grounds for refusing to
enforce a domestic award.9" The first three grounds are the
same as §260 (1) CPL for foreign-related awards.94 These are fur-
ther supplemented by grounds that: the "main evidence for find-
ing the facts is insufficient;" "there is an error in the application
of the law;" or the arbitrators were involved in any conduct of
"embezzlement, bribery, practicing favoritism for himself or rela-
tives, twisting the law in rendering arbitration award."9" The
subjective element of these grounds is compounded by what
amounts to a broad standard of de novo review.96 Without the
protection of the SPC adjudicative process, or the mandatory ju-
risdiction of the IPC or higher court, an outside party is vulnera-
ble to local protectionism in all its glory.97
The domestic application of these standards belies their
enormous significance. Most international direct investment
takes the form of wholly foreign-owned enterprises ("WFOE") or
foreign joint ventures ("FJV"), which are subject to compulsory
Chinese jurisdiction and domestic arbitration rules.98 Thus, all
related disputes must be arbitrated according to Chinese laws,
and the New York Convention will not apply.99 A dispute's classi-
fication as domestic or foreign-related determines the laws that
apply to enforcement; it is a critical distinction.0 0
92. See Zhou, supra note 20, at 449.
93. See CPL 1991, art. 217.
94. See id. arts. 217 (1)-(3), 260.
95. See id. art. 217 (4)-(6).
96. See Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 65 (outlining how the court can determine
that enforcement of the award would contradict "social and public interest").
97. Id. (debating whether drawback of abuses of de novo review outweighs benefit
of providing for protection of parties from arbitral incompetence).
98. See General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China arts.
37, 41(2) (promulgated by Order No. 37 of the President of the People's Republic of
China, Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), available at http://en.chinacourt.org/pub-
lic/detail.php?id=2696; see also Zhou, supra note 20, at 450-51.
99. See Zhou, supra note 20, at 450-51.
100. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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The notion of the "foreign" element in a Sino-Foreign ven-
ture was first tested in the 1992 case, China Int'l Eng'g Consultancy
Co. v. Lido Hotel Beijing. °' The Beijing IPC applied a very restric-
tive definition of "foreign element" and classified the dispute as
domestic. 0 2 CIETAC subsequently changed its rules of admis-
sion to include disputes between foreign investment enterprises
and wholly owned domestic companies. The court has neverthe-
less persisted with a restrictive interpretation of the pre-requisite
"foreign element." '03 In 2001, the Beijing Intermediate Court
again ruled against the foreign element of a WFOE in AmcorFlex-
ible Packing (Beijing) Co. v. China No. 22nd Metallurgy Constr.
Co., °4 regarding the rules applied by the Beijing Arbitration
Commission.0 5 Until there is definitive clarity in this area, the
rules of the applicable arbitration institution are of great im-
port.1 0
6
A. Recent Improvements on Enforcing Convention and
Foreign-Related Awards
Over the past ten years, the SPC has issued three Interpreta-
tions and Directives notable for their contribution towards im-
proving the recognition process.10 7 Most significantly, in 1995
the SPC established a reporting mechanism structured around
the courts' hierarchy to monitor judicial refusals to enforce Con-
vention and foreign-related awards.'0 8 According to the 1995
Notice, if an IPC intends to refuse to enforce a foreign or for-
101. See Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 11-12 (discussing China Int'l Eng'g Con-
sultancy Co. v. Lido Hotel Beijing (Beijing Interm. People's Ct., 1992), where Beijing In-
termediate People's Courts ("IPC") ruled that FJV established under Chinese law was
Chinese legal entity and fact thatJV was party in arbitration proceeding did not qualify
case as "foreign-related").
102. See id.
103. See Zhou, supra note 20, at 451-52.
104. See id. at 451-52 (discussing Amcor Flexible Packing (Beijing) Co. v. China No.
22nd Metallurgy Constr. Co. (Beijing No. 2 Interm. People's Ct.).
105. See id.
106. Compare Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 11-12 (Lido Hotel was under CIETAC
rules that have since been expanded), with Zhou, supra note 20, at 451-52 (Amcor was
under Beijing Arbitration Commission rules).
107. See Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 16-17.
108. Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Regarding the Han-
dling by the People's Court on Certain Issues Pertaining to Foreign-Related Arbitration
and Foreign Arbitration (issued by the Sup. People's Ct., Aug. 28, 1995, effective Aug.
28 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Reporting Notice], translated in TAO, supra note 20, at 308.
2007] 1331
1332 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 30:1318
eign-related award, it must first submit a report to the HPC. °9 If
the HPC agrees, it must report the case to the SPC. Only on the
SPC's approval can the IPC rule to refuse recognition or enforce
the award. t 0 According to Professor Randall Peerenboom, the
notice was "warmly welcomed" by investors."1 ' Peerenboom re-
fers to accounts of one SPC judge who claimed that SPC had
denied eighty percent of requests to refuse enforcement in the
first five years of the system's operation. 112
This reporting mechanism draws high-level attention to
cases in which the lower courts wish to deny recognition and
enforcement to awards, effectively inhibiting the exercise of lo-
cal protectionist concerns.113 The mechanism has also drawn
criticism, however: firstly, for not specifying whether it applies to
ad hoc awards; and, secondly, for failing to provide parties either
a right to participate in the hearing by the HPC, a right to be
notified about the hearing, or even the right to submit written
documents into the process." 4 Thirdly, the Reporting Notice
did not specify any time requirements, making it impossible to
determine how many cases are reported in a timely manner and
how many are left pending for years." 5 The potential signifi-
cance of such delays is well illustrated by the U.S.-based Con-
tiGroup Companies' efforts to enforce a $14 million arbitral
award against Shandong Zhucheng Foreign Trade Company.1 6
The petition for enforcement was referred from the IPC in
Qingdao, to the HPC in Shandong, and finally to the SPC. 117
Once the petition was referred into the Reporting Mechanism,
rather than ruling within sixty days as required by Arbitration
109. Id.
110. See TAO, supra note 20, at 308; see also Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 28-29.
111. See Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 29.
112. See id. at 28-30 (reporting that the SPC "denied eighty percent of the requests
to refuse enforcement" and criticizing the system's exclusion of foreign ad hoc arbitra-
tion, the lack of a procedure to supervise non-reported but not enforced cases, and
limited application to foreign invested companies).
113. See id.
114. Id.
115. See id. (discussing lack of time restriction). Time limits were subsequently
prescribed in the Setting Aside Notice. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
116. U.S. Comm. on Ways & Means, Statement ofJ.P. Gorgue, ContiGroup Com-
panies Inc., New York (2005), http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?form-
mode=view&id=2904 (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
117. Id.
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Law, 18 the courts had delayed for several years; and Con-
tigroup's enforcement efforts resorted to a pleading to the U.S.
Congress for political assistance in enforcing the award."'
Furthermore, due to the finality of the appeals process, the
Reporting Mechanism can be a double-edged sword. Article 140
of the CPL provides that there is no appeal of a court's refusal to
enforce, but it is subject to adjudicative supervision by a higher
court.12 0  Having already gone through the reporting mecha-
nism, however, the higher court would have reviewed any case to
refuse enforcement and would have approved the decision. It is
highly unlikely to decide differently second time around.'12  In
reality, the petitioner's only recourse would be to look for assets
in other jurisdictions or try to re-arbitrate, both of which are un-
likely to be successful.' 21
The second notable SPC contribution came in 1998 when it
promulgated the Fee Regulation, aimed at reducing the maxi-
mum time for a court to complete enforcement of a Convention
award to eight months.12 ' This regulation requires courts to is-
sue a decision within two months of receiving the application
and complete enforcement within a further six months. 124 This
timeline, however, is contradicted by an even shorter six-month
timeline for enforcement in the Enforcement Regulation passed
four months earlier,125 which applies to both foreign awards and
118. Arbitration Law, art. 60.
119. See U.S. Comm. On Ways & Means, supra note 116.
120. CPL 1991, art. 140. Thejudges and officials in the adjudicative process, how-
ever, are strangers to the proceedings. It can nonetheless be effective, as in the
Dong/eng Garment Factory case. See generally Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 38 n.165.
121. See Peerenboom, supra note 25,at 28-29. See generally Zhiping, supra note 10
(cultural factors mitigating against an overruling or reverse judgment).
122. See Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 39 (noting the difficulty of re-arbitrating if
the issue was anything other that procedural in nature). Further, in light of the
problems enforcing awards in China, the foreign applicant would have first sought en-
forcement abroad. For a domestic award, an applicant may get a different result in a
different domestic court by virtue of de novo review. See CPL 1991, art. 217.
123. Regulations of the Supreme People's Court Regarding the Issue of Fees and
Investigation Periods for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Nov. 14, 1998, effective Nov. 21, 1998) [herein-
after Fee Regulation], translated in TAo, supra note 20, at 312. It is not clear whether
the drafters intended to exclude non-Convention awards and foreign-related awards. If
so, it would be inconsistent with the 1995 Reporting Notice. See supra note 108 and
accompanying text; see also Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 65.
124. See Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 65.
125. See The Rules of the NSC Concerning Several Enforcement Issues (Provi-
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awards made by Chinese arbitration institutions.1"6 This Regula-
tion also provides for a time extension if "really needed in spe-
cial circumstances," which are regrettably not defined. 27 Given
that neither six nor eight months is a realistic timeframe for en-
forcement, this inconsistency is merely a technical observation,
but one that should be clarified by the SPC. 128
Finally, in 2002 the SPC issued a Directive taking decisive
action to help insulate Convention and foreign-related awards
from local protectionist interference. 129 These rules limit the ju-
risdiction of all civil and commercial cases involving foreign ele-
ments to specific IPCs in capital cities of provinces and special
economic zones.1 3 ° This jurisdictional protection works in con-
junction with the SPC 1995 Reporting Mechanism to minimize
the frustrations to due process. 13 ' Theoretically, because parties
must file for enforcement to a higher court, they deal with
judges and officials more removed from local politics and eco-
nomic considerations. 3 2 In summary, although they have their
own inconsistencies, loopholes, ambiguities, and omissions,
these recent developments are real attempts to provide safe-
guards for acknowledged weaknesses in the system.1 33
B. Procedural Requirements
Despite these more recent improvements to the system, the
process of achieving recognition for an arbitral award, no matter
sional) art. 107 (issued by the NSC on July 8, 1998) [hereinafter Enforcement Regula-
tion], translated in Mo, supra note 41, at 672.
126. Id. arts. 2(3), 2(5).
127. Id. art. 107.
128. See Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 65 (noting how courts continue to ignore
the time limits for accepting a case and leave enforcement cases pending).
129. The Supreme People's Court Rules on the Several Issues Regarding the Juris-
dictions of Civil and Commercial Litigation Cases Involving Foreign Elements (promul-
gated by the Sup. People's Ct., Dec. 25, 2001, effective Mar. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Juris-
dictions], translated in Luo, supra note 12, at 269.
130. Id. arts. 1, 3(3), 3(4) (rules are applicable to cases applying for the revoca-
tion, recognition, or enforcement of international arbitration awards and cases review-
ing the validity of foreign civil and commercial arbitration clauses, inter alia). See gener-
ally Ellen Reinstein, Finding A Happy Ending For Foreign Investors: The Enforcement Of Arbi-
tration Awards In The People's Republic Of China, 16 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 37, 66
(2005).
131. See Reinstein, supra note 130, at 66.
132. Id. (stating that the law is in order to correctively adjudicate civil and com-
mercial cases involving foreign elements).
133. See generally Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 16-17.
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what its origin, is a lengthy, unpredictable process that involves
considerable procedural hurdles.' 34 Regardless of the nature of
the award, it must be entered into a P.R.C. court to achieve rec-
ognition and comply with onerous evidentiary requirements.
3 5
The domicile of defendants, the place of infringement, or
the location of the assets determines the relevant Chinese juris-
diction.1"6 Any objection to jurisdiction must be raised very early
in the proceedings to be considered.1 37 Such motions are fre-
quently used by parties as a delay tactic.1 38
Three judges hear cases: the chief judge and two assistant
judges.139 Ultimately, it is their role to ascertain the facts, and
they have far-reaching interrogative powers with which to do
so. 14° Remarkably for lawyers accustomed to civil procedure in
Western jurisdictions, in China there are no rules against ex parte
communications; indeed, such contact is perceived as part of the
process.' 4 ' There is provision for one limited appeal, but arbi-
tration awards are subject to different adjudication processes de-
pending on their origin, as discussed supra.14 2
The outcomes of the process are as multifarious and uncer-
tain as the extra-judicial inputs. 4 3 Firstly, the court can refuse
recognition (subject to the reporting process outlined above)."'
In this scenario, the petitioner of a Convention award can still
take the award to another Convention jurisdiction where assets
134. See Dennis Unkovic, Enforcing Arbitration Awards in China, 59 Disp. REsOL. J. 68
(Dec. 2004-Jan. 2005). See generally Peerenboom, supra note 25.
135. See CPL 1991, ch. 6; see also Several Rules of the Supreme People's Court on
Evidence in Civil Procedures 2001 (promulgated Dec. 21, 2001, effective Apr. 1, 2002),
translated in WEI, supra note 12, at 243.
136. CPL 1991, art. 259 (the CPL 1991 revisioris excluded enforcement jurisdic-
tion at the place of arbitration).
137. Id. art. 38 (providing that if a party rejects jurisdiction after the case is ac-
cepted, it may only contest jurisdiction during the period for submitting briefs).
138. See Andrew Aglionby, Partner, Baker & McKenzie (Hong Kong), China-Re-
lated Litigation and Arbitration: Are You Ready?, Remarks at Baker & McKenzie Pres-
entation (Oct. 16, 2006).
139. See generally CPL 1991, art. 40.
140. Id. arts. 2, 116.
141. See Chris X. Lin, A Quiet Revolution: An Overview of China's Judicial Reform, 4
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'YJ. 255, 297 (2003) (arguing against practice of unilateral contact
with judges).
142. CPL 1991, art. 10 (if there are two trials, the second one is final); see also supra
notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
143. See generally Lin, supra note 141 (ex parte hearings and unilateral contact).
144. See 1995 Reporting Notice, supra note 108.
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are located against which the award can be enforced. 4 ' A fortu-
nate side effect of China's growth is increased outbound FDI
which could, in turn, have the effect of providing a greater num-
ber of potential forums for enforcement.'46 Secondly, in the
case of awards issued in China, the respondents can apply to
have the award set aside.' 4 7 The grounds for setting aside Con-
vention and foreign-related awards in Chinsee law are the same
as those for refusal to enforce, but much narrower than the
grounds that apply to domestic awards.
148
The consequences of setting aside an award are more severe
than refusal to enforce, as it effectively invalidates the award, so
it might not be enforced in another New York Convention juris-
diction.'4 9 In recognition of the severity of this outcome, in
1998 the SPC set up a similar reporting mechanism for setting
aside foreign-related awards as the 1995 mechanism for refusal
to enforce. 5 0 Unlike the reporting system for the refusal to en-
force mechanism, the setting aside regulation created tight
deadlines: the threatening IPC has thirty days to report to the
HPC; if the HPC agrees, the HPC should report to the SPC
within fifteen days. 5 '
If, however, the collegiate bench of three judges rules that
an award should be enforced, they appoint the enforcement of-
ficer.15 2 The enforcement officer sends notice to the party sub-
ject to enforcement, ordering the party to fulfill its obligations
within a specified time limit.'53 If the party fails to comply, the
145. See New York Convention, supra note 53.
146. Increased Chinese foreign investment overseas should result in a greater se-
lection of available jurisdictions in which to enforce arbitral awards against P.R.C. par-
ties under the New York Convention. See New York Convention, supra note 53.
147. See Arbitration Law, art. 58. This only applies to domestic awards issued by a
Chinese arbitration commission. There is a six-month limitation period for such an
application under Arbitration Law 1994, Article 59.
148. See Arbitration Law, art. 70 (referring to list of grounds in conformity with the
New York Convention in CPL 1991, art. 260).
149. See New York Convention, supra note 53, art. V(1) (e) (The award has not yet
become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent
authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.).
150. See Notice of the Sup. People's Ct. on Certain Issues Relating to the Revoca-
tion by the People's Ct. of Foreign-Related Arbitration Awards (promulgated by the
Sup. People's Ct. on Apr. 23, 1998) [hereinafter Setting Aside Notice], translated in
TAO, supra note 20, at 309; Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 43.
151. See 1995 Reporting Notice, supra note 108.
152. See Clarke, supra note 30, at 12.
153. See CPL 1991, art. 219. The statute of limitations is particularly short, only six
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court may take coercive action.'54 The courts have their own po-
lice force dedicated to enforcement, but, compared to the regu-
lar police force, they have lesser authority and are held in far
lower esteem.1 55 This inferior status is an intrinsic weakness in
the enforcement of judgments, including arbitral awards.
III. OBSTACLES TO ENFORCEMENT
"At present, the most prominent problem in economic adju-
dication is the difficulty of executing judgments." 15 6 Since this
comment by the President of the Supreme Peoples' Court in
1988, the difficulty of executing court judgments has continued
to receive much attention both inside and outside China, not
least in the dramatic headlines of the Western media.1 57
Clearly, the lack of enforcement can be a crucial issue for
firms with capital invested in China; it is hard to quantify, how-
ever.1 58 The "significant economic interests" of both the Chi-
nese government and the Chinese arbitration institutions dis-
courage the provision of accurate information from official
sources.' 59 That said, in the late nineties Peerenboom con-
ducted an empirical study of the enforcement of arbitral awards
that has provided some meaningful insights into what factors are
affecting enforcement, somne of which are discussed infra, in ad-
dition to the author's own observations. 160
A. Institutional Obstacles
The contrast between the Chinese legal system and legal sys-
tems in the Western hemisphere, especially the Common Law
jurisdictions, is stark.16' China has "essentially had to create a
modern legal system from scratch since 1978. " 162 For example,
months for companies and one year for natural persons. The onerous translation re-
quirements mean this is often too short. See Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 21.
154. See CPL 1991, art. 220.
155. See Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 10.
156. See Clarke, supra note 30, at 2 n.2 (citing Sup. People's Ct.Work Report, Apr.
1, 1988, reprinted in Sup. PEOPLE'S CT. GAZETrE [SPCG], No. 2, June 20, 1988).
157. See Clarke, supra note 30, at 27.
158. See generally No Dispute About it, supra note 3.
159. See Randall Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts: An Empirical Study of Enforce-
ment Arbitral Awards in the P.tXC., 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 249,259 (2001).
160. See id.
161. See generally Zhiping, supra note 10, at 57 (discussing Chinese legal culture).
162. See id.
20071 1337
1338 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 30:1318
it was only ten years ago that lawyers were permitted to act in the
interests of their clients rather than the interests of the State.1 6 3
As analyzed above, recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards in China have their shortcomings, but are subject to on-
going, gradual improvements by the SPC.'164 The larger, more
fundamental obstacles, however, are institutional in nature. 6
As Peerenboom argues, focusing on drafting precise laws in the
current institutional framework would be like "playing erhu while
Beijing burns."166
1. The Judiciary
"Simply put, the courts are weak. 1 67 Companies do not re-
spect judges, nor do lower courts seem to respect higher courts,
and local protectionism and corruption are rife. 168  Within
China, the legal system is still held in very low esteem, and
judges and the judiciary have a status on a par with regular State
bureaucrats. 69
China has over 200,000 judges in an appointed judiciary
that still lacks any formal judicial career structure. 7 0 The vast
majority of judges, many of whom come from the military, are
poorly educated and have no legal training. 7 ' As a result, many
judges are not familiar with the rules and procedures on the rec-
ognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.' 7 2 In a judicial sys-
tem that is focused on criminal cases and de-motivated by lax
performance quotas, there is little incentive to actively pursue
cases beyond those. 7 3 The 1995 Judges Law strove to raise stan-
163. See Sheehy, supra note 7, at 251 (discussing changes in Judges Law 1996 al-
lowing lawyers to act in interests of clients rather than the State).
164. See supra notes 107-134 and accompanying text.
165. See Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 2-3.
166. See Peerenboom, supra note 159, at 319. The Erhu is a Chinese string instru-
ment.
167. See Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 63.
168. See id. at 53.
169. See id. at 9.
170. See Clarke, supra note 30, at 6, 10.
171. Mo Zhang, International Civil Litigation In China: A Practical an Analysis of the
Chinese Judicial System, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. Rv. 59, 94-95 (2002).
172. See id. at 94-95; see also Judges Law of the P.R.C., art. 9 (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. People's Nat. Cong., Feb. 28, 1995, revisedJun. 30, 2001, effectiveJan.
1, 2002), translated in ISINOLAW (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
173. See Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 63; see also Clarke, supra note 30, at 37-38
(reasoning that enforcement of civil judgments has not been an area of concern for
courts who are more focused on criminal adjudication and sentencing); see also Sheehy,
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dards for new judges and required current judges to meet the
standards within a reasonable time.1 74 Confirmed judges were
allowed to stay on, subject to the training requirement.175 This is
an area that will take time to improve, as a new generation of
Chinese-qualified lawyers navigates the ranks of this changing
profession.176 Skilled, specialized judges capable of handling
the increasing magnitude and complexity of disputes subject to
arbitration will be in high demand. 77
In addition, judges and court officers are entirely depen-
dent on the corresponding level of government for their tenure,
financing, and housing, 78 described by one Chinese commenta-
tor as the "institutional flaw" of the Chinese judiciary. 179  Al-
though the People's Congress is formally empowered to appoint
judges, in practice and as previously noted, judges are frequently
selected from the ranks of the Communist Party of China
("CCP").180 Personal connections are also a major factor, partic-
ularly in the smaller towns and provinces where local protection-
ism is rife. 8 ' The lack of qualification and independence is a
great cause for concern. 8 2
That said, the courts are the only institution in China to
have putative authority to issue orders cutting across bureau-
cratic and territorial boundaries, provided that jurisdictional re-
quirements are satisfied.18 There is automatic "full faith and
credit," but this strongly relies on comity between courts in dif-
supra note 7, at 257-58 (describing how private law is now priority due to its neglect
prior to and since 1949).
174. See Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 28 n.46.
175. Judges Law of the P.R.C. The law requires at least one to three years of prior
legal work experience, depending on legal education.
176. See generally Xin Chunying, What Kind of Judicial Power Does China Need?, 1
INT'LJ. CONST. L. 58 (2003); see alsojudges Law of the P.R.C., art. 9; Lin, supra note 141,
at 257-59.
177. See generally Lin, supra note 141.
178. See, e.g., Lin, supra note 141, at 294-95 (citing Cangan County v. Long Gang
Rubber Molding, Inc, in which a county-level court disregarded facts and law to decide in
favor of controller of country treasury office suspected of fraud because he funded the
court).
179. Id. at 295 (quoting Professor He Weifang of Peking University Law School).
180. See Lin, supra note 141, at 295-96; see alsoJames V. Feinerman, Chinese Partici-
pation in the International Legal Order: Rogue Elephant or Team Player?, 141 CHINA Q. 161,
195 (1995) (discussing courts subject to political pressures from Communist Party).
181. See Clarke, supra note 30, at 41.
182. See generally Lin, supra note 178.
183. See Clarke, supra note 30,at 5.
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ferent provinces and states. 84
2. The Enforcement Chamber
The status of the Enforcement Chamber is even less than
that of the main court.185 According to a number of sources,
young and capable officers go to the adjudicatory chambers,
while the execution chamber is the refuge of the tired, the medi-
ocre, and the uneducated.' 86 Practitioners perceive under-
staffed and under-funded courts that are incapable of the foot-
work required to collect money and assets.187 Even if a court
upholds an award, there are still daunting challenges at the en-
forcement stage. 88
Indicative of the low esteem in which judges and enforce-
ment officers are held are numerous reports of officials being
threatened or beaten by the respondent's workers, shareholders,
or creditors.' 81 Peerenboom cites an occasion on which an ap-
plicant went with his lawyer, twenty judges, and court police to
seek possession of assets subject to an award, only for the en-
tourage to be locked in the warehouse where the assets were lo-
cated. 1 9 0
B. Other Obstacles to Enforcement
1. Civil Procedure
Local protectionism thrives on the weaknesses of the judici-
ary and the enforcement chambers; it is further exacerbated,
however, by the rules of civil procedure.' The role of ex parte
hearings before, during, and after court hearings is a key fac-
tor.19 2 Not only are such hearings permissible, but there are no
rules on what types of contact are acceptable. 9 ' Stories abound
of instances where this has affected the outcome of a case di-
184. Id. at 5-6 (makes courts powerful, in theory).
185. Id. at 12-15.
186. Id.
187. See No Dispute About It, supra note 3 (citing Michael Moser, vice-chairman of
the Hong Kong Arbitration Commission).
188. Id.
189. See Peerenboom, supra note 159, at 300-01.
190. See id.
191. See Lin, supra note 141, at 262, 287 n.104.
192. Id. at 286-87.
193. See id. at 286; see also Aglionby, supra note 138.
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rectly or indirectly and to mitigate the effects, forum shopping is
widely used. 19 4 On a regional scale, the SPC's reporting mecha-
nism for refusal to enforce and setting aside awards also helps
mitigate its impact, albeit at the back end of the process. 95
Furthermore, there are onerous evidentiary requirements
that can be easily abused deliberately or inadvertently to substan-
tially delay the process:' 96 an application to enforce must contain
comprehensive information about the proceedings, an original
or notarized copy of the award, the arbitration agreement,
power of attorney and documentation of the applicant's legal
representative, and a notarized and consularized certificate of
incorporation or analogous documentation.1 97 All documents
must be in Chinese and accompanied by the enforcement
fees.' "98 Not surprisingly, judges often do not understand these
rules and demand additional evidence, including evidence sub-
mitted to arbitration proceedings that must be translated and
notarized.'99 It is often unclear whether this is a consequence of
judicial incompetence or merely local protectionism at play.20 0
2. Political Interference
Despite the strong links between the CCP and the judiciary,
it is reported that government officials interfere with the courts
more frequently than does the CCP.201 In this new era of
China's economic development priorities, the CCP party leaders
have motives aligned to those of investors and, conscious of
China's reputation, may actually help enforce judgments. 20 2 In
the case of one CIETAC award, the foreign lawyer enlisted the
help of the local Political-Legal Committee Secretary, whose in-
fluence trumped that of the local party's senior court and was
thus able to secure enforcement of the award for the foreign
194. See Aglionby, supra note 138.
195. See 1995 Reporting Notice, supra note 108.
196. See Aglionby, supra note 138.
197. See Several Rules of the People's Court on Evidence in Civil Procedures, arts.
10-12 (Promulgated by the SPC, Dec. 21, 2001) [hereinafter SPC Evidence Procedures],
translated in Luo, supra note 12, at 246.
198. See id. art. 12; see also Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 19-20.
199. See Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 19-20.
200. Seeid. at 20.
201. Peerenboom, supra note 159, at 286.
202. Id.
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0 3
According to Peerenboom, local protectionism is the most
cited obstacle to enforcement; and its most significant manifesta-
tion is delay or difficulty discovering assets of respondents.
2 0 4
For example, a senior judge was asked by a government official
who was friends with the Chinese respondent in a case to in-
struct the presiding judge to "drag his feet," which he was able to
do for more than two years. 20 5 A similar fate befell TriNorth
Capital Inc., a Canadian firm that secured a $4.2 million arbitra-
tion award against a Chinese party, but found that the local
court refused to enforce it. 20 6 The municipality that owned the
respondent company appointed the local judges.20 7 TriNorth
appealed to the SPC, but it was three years before they got their
money.20 8
3. Insolvency
Statistically, insolvency is the most cited reason for non-en-
forcement. 20 9 Triangular debt arrangements play a big role.2 1
Although there are laws allowing for subrogation, it is limited to
the scope of the claim of the creditor and relies on substantial
court interference, which is often lacking.21 In this transition-
ing, vulnerable economy, local governments are very reluctant to
declare companies bankrupt because of the resulting effect on
unemployment and tax revenues.21 2 Hence, local government
officials will try to discourage enforcement of awards that would
203. Id. at 287.
204. Id. at 276 (statistically, it did not seem to be so significant in the results of his
survey).
205. Id. at 277.
206. See Tamara Loomis, The China Syndrome, CORP. COUNSEL, May 26, 2005.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See generally Peerenboom, supra note 159, at 273 (citing insolvency of the re-
spondent as reason for non-enforcement in forty three percent of thirty-seven cases,
with another four settling for partial enforcement; in only one cases was respondent
formally bankrupt).
210. Id. at 274. Triangular debt refers to the situation in which one State-owned
company owes money to another company, which in turn owes money to a third com-
pany, and so on.
211. See Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 56.
212. See Peerenboom, supra note 159, at 278 (State-owned enterprise reforms have
also contributed to increased unemployment, adding social welfare and retraining costs
to the already strained budgets of local governments. Increased unemployment not
only causes budgetary problems but may lead to social unrest).
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mean bankruptcy for a local respondent. 213
Protectionist interests can induce officials to tip off local
companies about applications for enforcement, enabling them
to transfer assets before the order for enforcement is made.2 14
The RevPower case is an infamous example, which has had a pro-
foundly and disproportionately negative impact on China's repu-
tation for enforcement. 2 5 The court not only allowed for paral-
lel proceedings and misapplied Chinese law, but also exercised
dilatory tactics with respect to the enforcement proceedings. 216
After seven years of international arbitration and P.R.C. court
proceedings, a Shanghai court finally recognized an award for
$4.5 million plus interest and fees. Unfortunately, the Chinese
respondent had already transferred all its assets to other compa-
nies, and the petitioner was left with nothing.217
In recognition of this tendency, China now has laws aimed
at mitigating the risks of insolvency being a bar to recovery. 218
Asset protection comprises attachment, sequestration, freezing,
sealing up, and provision of security.219 It is the respondent's
duty to tell the court where assets are located, 22' and the court
can use compulsory measures to discover concealed assets. 2 2 '
This process, however, relies on the court's enforcement divi-
sion; consequently, the reality is that parties must conduct their
own investigations.222 This can be very difficult to do, even with
the help of private investigators and high-level guanxi.2 2 3
By law, companies are to maintain only one bank account
for tax reasons, and to file their accounts with the local govern-
213. Id.
214. Id. at277.
215. Idat 251 (stating that the impact of Revpower on public opinion "has been
nothing short of staggering").
216. Id.
217. Id. at 250 n.5.
218. See Arbitration Law, arts. 28, 46, 68. Preliminary relief can be applied for that
can cover both assets and evidence.
219. See CPL 1991, art. 221.
220. See id. art. 29.
221. See id. art. 31
222. See Peerenboom, supra note 159, at 277.
223. See id. Guanxi is the Chinese concept of social connections and relationships.
See generally Guanxi: The China Letter, http://www.guanxionline.com (last visited Apr.
16, 2007).
20071 1343
1344 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 30:1318
ment.224 In theory, there should be various sources of publicly
available asset information; but, in reality, it is very difficult to
gain access without the high-level guanxi needed to open the
metaphorical filing cabinets. 225 Likewise, it is very difficult to as-
certain title on real estate due to opaque transfers and lax record
keeping.226 Procuring information from banks is particularly
problematic, as they tend to protect their customers in an in-
creasingly competitive environment.227 Banks have therefore
been known to postpone taking action on a court's order until
they have had adequate time to notify the customer to transfer
the money to another account. 22 Furthermore, banks perceive
the courts as bureaucratic equals from whom they do not like to
take orders.2 29 This situation is particularly significant given the
paucity of legal remedies for fraudulent transfers230 and piercing
the corporate veil.231
4. Corruption
Corruption and bribery are still perceived as endemic in the
Chinese judiciary and arbitration institutions.23 2 After all the
224. See Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 48 (discussing Commercial Banking Law of
the P.R.C. art. 48).
225. See Peerenboom, supra note 159, at 293.
226. See id. ("All too often, either intentionally or simply for lack of legal expertise,
[real estate] transfers are inadequately documented or violate legal requirements. As a
result, it is frequently hard to sort out who owns which assets."); see also Peerenboom,
supra note 25, at 50 ("Although such records filed with the real estate bureau are sup-
posed to be available to the public, personal connections are often necessary to access
the records.").
227. See Clarke, supra note 30, at 73 (highlighting that banks operating under
more competitive regime are anxious to avoid offending customers); see also Peer-
enboom, supra note 159, at 293 (showing banks are not willing to divulge account infor-
mation for fear of damaging relations with customers).
228. See Clarke, supra note 30, at 73.
229. Id. at 74 (discussing banks' perception of courts as a parallel bureaucracy as
noted in interview with lawyer).
230. See generally, Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 12 (laws and regulations prohibit-
ing parties from concealing or transferring assets or undergoing reorganization to
avoid liabilities).
231. See CPL 1991, arts. 44, 213; see also 1992 SPC Civil Procedure Opinion, arts.
271-77 (where an enterprise as legal person is divided or merged, its rights and obliga-
tions shall be enjoyed and assumed by new legal person that results from change);
Enforcement Regulation, arts. 76-83 (failing to provide general criteria for piercing
corporate veil but providing guidelines for specific circumstances relevant to enforce-
ment of awards); accord Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 61-62.
232. See Lin, supra note 141, at 294-95 (discussing judicial corruption as an impe-
tus for reform); see also Jamil Anderlini, Lawyer Suspended as Fuji Corruption Probe's Net
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changes of the past two centuries, and most recently the demise
of communism, some commentators argue that an ideological
void is being filled by hard-edged capitalism.23 The sudden
surge of economic ambition fuels corruption and encourages
disrespect for the law, legal obligations, and the courts' or-
ders.234
Official statistics indicate that incidence of fraud and cor-
ruption is rising.235 It is hard to discern, however, whether this is
an absolute increase or whether the rise can be attributed to a
greater number of apprehended offenders.2 16 In addition to in-
cidents involving the judiciary and law-enforcement officials,
there have been a number of high-profile cases of arbitration
officials being arrested and charged with corruption. 237 The fact
Widens. Graft-ridden Arbitration System on Trial as Beijing Seeks to Boost Its Credibility, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 7, 2006 (reporting on views held by foreign lawyers in China
and Hong Kong).
233. SeeJessica C. Stabile, Clashes Between Economies And Environments: Consumerism
Versus Conservation in Taiwan and Hong Kong, 7 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 125 (2006)
(asserting that urbanization, capitalism, increasing average household incomes, and ris-
ing middle class lead to emergence of individualism and growth of consumer ethic in
mainland China); see also Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform After
Twenty Years, 20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 383, 404-05 (2000) ("The corruption problem
seems only to worsen. So tightly knit are corrupt practices into the fabric of modern
Chinese society that they are almost invisible. Invoice fraud, diversion of government
investment capital, bribery, and misappropriation of central and local government
funds all seem to have become a way of life .... The universal assumption that all
officials and corporate managers are corrupt is probably responsible for the speed with
which disgruntled workers take to the streets; civil protest, mostly peaceful, is reported
almost daily by the foreign (not Chinese) press in China."); TRANSPARENCY INTERNA-
TIONAL, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2005: CORRUPTION IN CONSTRUCTION AND
POsT-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION, http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/
download.gcr#download (last visited Feb. 19, 2007) (rating China 3.2 of 10 point scale,
where score of 10 signifies least corruption and 0 signifies most corruption).
234. See Peerenboom, supra note 159, at 319 (describing the side-effects of a "get
rich quick" mentality).
235. See id. at 303 n.195 (citing Xiao Yang, President of the Supreme People's
Court, confirming that law-enforcement personnel are involved in such malpractice as
eating free meals, taking without paying, imposing man-made barriers, soliciting favors,
demanding and taking bribes, perverting justice for money, and bullying the common
people); see also John Pomfret, Chinese Officials Bare Flaws of Legal System, WASH.
PosT,Mar. 11, 1999, at A24 (reporting that the number ofjudges convicted of abusing
power jumped from 1051 in 1997 to 2512 in 1998).
236. See Pomfret, supra note 235.
237. See Jamil Anderlini, Arbitration Boss Arrested in Swoop on Staff "Fees,"S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Mar. 23, 2006 (reporting that the Secretary-General of CIETAC was
arrested on charges of financial irregularity); see also Anderlini, supra note 232 (report-
ing that lawyer was suspended from Chinese law firm for role in at least one secret
meeting between lawyers representing respondent and overseeing arbitrators).
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that these cases have started to attract so much attention is an
indication that such behavior is becoming less acceptable.23 s
How robust this ethical infusion will be to the temptations of
rapid economic growth and opportunity remains to be seen.23 9
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
A. Institutional Reforms
Given its current structure, the judiciary is effectively power-
less to mitigate the effects of local protectionism.24 ° Protection-
ism, along with corruption, is endemic within the system.2 4 '
There has been great discussion of, and attempts at, judicial re-
form in recent years, but with little and slow effect;2 4 2 the judici-
ary remains the weakest link in the chain.2 43
In assessing what is required, it is inappropriate to simply
compare the Chinese structure with a Common Law model, to
thereby identify any shortcomings and prescribe accordingly.
244
The contrasting legal history and culture of adjudication must
be remembered. 24 5 Commentators suggest that there is gradual
acceptance of the more Western concepts of separation of pow-
ers and judicial independence, but that they have not been ap-
plied.246 Sustainable institutional reform needs to be an indige-
nous, gradual process so as not to destabilize a vulnerable system
still in transition.2 4 7
1. Judicial Independence
The lack ofjudicial independence is one of the more funda-
238. See Anderlini, supra note 237.
239. See Peerenboom, supra note 159, at 319.
240. See generally Peerenboom, supra note 159.
241. See Lin, supra note 141, at 294-95 (judicial corruption as internal impetus for
reform).
242. See generally Chunying, supra note 176.
243. See supra notes 170-190 and accompanying text (discussing the judiciary).
244. See supra notes 9, 10, 56 and accompanying text (contrasting legal cultures).
245. See Clarke, supra note 30, at 83-84.
246. See generally Lin, supra note 141.
247. See Lin, supra note 141, at 297 (need for slow and cautious structural reform);
see also, e.g., Etelle R. Higonnet, Restructuring Hybrid Courts: Local Empowerment And Na-
tional Criminal Justice Reform, 23 Asiz. J. INr'L & CoMP. L. 347 (2006) (arguing the im-
portance of integrating international norms with local judicial jurisdictions to allow for
sustainable reform).
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mental obstacles to reliable enforcement. 248 Although it is a rec-
ognized principle in the Chinese Constitution and laws, it is in-
dependence of a uniquely Chinese character.249 One cannot as-
sume a Western notion of judicial independence, whereby
judicial power derives directly from the Constitution and is sub-
ject only to checks and balances.25 ° In China, the People's Con-
gress is the source of all power, including the Constitution, thus
placing an inherent limitation on the courts' powers.251
It has thus become very difficult to find a balance between
increased supervision of the judiciary and the weakness in the
system that derives from too many layers of scrutiny.25 2 Applying
extra tiers of supervision can merely exacerbate the very
problems of corruption and systemic cost that they are intended
to remedy. Scrutiny by those not familiar with the cases can
quickly become unwelcome intrusion that interferes with the ad-
ministration of justice.253 Reforms aimed at promoting judicial
independence should thus be focused on minimizing the layers
of bureaucratic supervision and enabling the courts to exercise
their power more equitably and free from interference. 254
To promote these aims, a clearer model code on judicial
independence is required, beyond that promoted by the Judicial
Code of Ethics in 2001.255 An explicit standard, even if not ad-
hered to, is better than no standard at all and sets the bar for
improvement. The author believes that, even if promoted only
as an international standard applicable to foreign-related cases,
248. See Mo Zhang, International Civil Litigation In China: A Practical an Analysis of
the Chinese Judicial System, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 59, 93 (2002); see also Chunying,
supra note 176, at 68-69.
249. Xian Fa [Constitution], art. 126, (1999) (P.R.C.), available at http://english.
people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.htm; Organic Law of the People's Courts,
(1983) (P.R.C.); Law of Judges, arts. 1, 8, (2001) (P.R.C.). See supra notes 12, 175 and
accompanying text; Zhang, supra note 248, at 94-95; see also CPL, art. 6.
250. See Chunying, supra note 242, at 68-69.
251. Id.
252. See Zhang, supra note 248, at 94-95.
253. See Chunying, supra note 176, at 72.
254. Id. at 70.
255. See Code of Judicial Ethics for the People's Republic of China, 2002, available at
http://www.accci.com.au/code.htm. See generally Stuart Hoberman, Judicial Indepen-
dence: A Critical Issue For The Bar And Bench, N.J. LAw., MAGAZINE (Apr. 2006) (impor-
tance of independent judiciary); Tobin A. Sparling, Keeping Up Appearances: The Consti-
tutionality Of The Model Code OfJudicial Conduct's Prohibition Of Extrajudicial Speech Creating
The Appearance Of Bias, 19 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441 (2006) (discussing the importance
of independent judiciary).
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it would allow a line to be drawn between acceptable and unac-
ceptable behavior.
To mitigate the impact of local government on the judicial
process, the interests of the judiciary need to be uncoupled from
those of local government. 256 Centralizing the funding and con-
trol of the courts would free judges from dependency on local
interests for their status and welfare. 257 Such an initiative could
also promote a greater sense of cohesion and professionalism
among the judiciary.25 8 In addition to the improvements
brought about with the Law of Judges 1995 and the 2001 Code
of Ethics, the training and performance of judges should be
monitored centrally to promote consistency throughout the
country. 259 Furthermore, in the interests ofjustice, the "reasona-
ble time" for long-tenured judges to meet the new standards on
education and performance should be deemed to have passed,
and those judges still falling short should be worked out of the
system, as capacity allows.260
256. See Lin, supra note 141, at 296 (advocating Professor He Weifangs' proposal
of "delocalization" of courts for unified court system); see also Kahn, supra note 1 (dis-
cussing a particular instance of the protection of influential companies and suppression
of dissent as well as the power of a company in a "company town").
257. See Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 8 (describing the fiscal vulnerability of the
judiciary); see also Zhang, supra note 257, at 94 ("the operating expenses, including
salaries of the judges, are provided from the local government budget").
258. See Zhang, supra note 248, at 94-96. However, this would also challenge the
current unitary state in which separation of powers is not a dominant theme.
259. SeeJudges Law of the P.R.C., supra note 172, art. 9 (providing certain require-
ments for a people's court judge including: (1) Chinese citizenship; (2) twenty-three
years of age; (3) upholding the Chinese Constitution; (4) having good political and
professional quality and morale; (5) good health; and (6) qualifying educational re-
quirements).
In addition, on October 18, 2001, the Supreme People's Court adopted The Basic
Principles of Professional Ethics ofJudges of the People's Republic of China ("Ethics Code"). The
Ethics Code consists of fifty articles aimed at standardizing and perfecting the profes-
sional ethical norms of judges, improving and enhancing the professional quality of
judges, and maintaining the good image of judges in the general public. See Zhang,
supra note 248, at 95 n.265 (citing Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Fa Guan Zhi Ye
Dao De Ji Ben Zhun Ze [The Basic Principles of Professional Ethics of Judges of the
P.R.C.] (2001), http://www.law-lib.com/law/lawview.html).
260. SeeJudges Law of the P.R.C., supra note 172, art. 9 (allowing those judges in
place before the law's date of effectiveness to retain their positions). There is still con-
cern that the standards are not high enough, as a law degree is not a minimum require-
ment. See Zhang, supra note 248, at 95.
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2. Enforcement
In addition, the enforcement chambers need to be strength-
ened. 261 A pragmatic and expeditious solution would be to put
court police on the same standing as regular police, or, more
significantly, to integrate the two systems.2 6 2 While this presents
great challenges, given the regular police focus on criminal en-
forcement, enforcing arbitral awards against reluctant parties
often does involve criminal conduct, and the efficacy of using
the police could have the aggregate effect of reducing the en-
forcement time. 2 6 3  Additionally, consolidated, authoritative
rules on enforcement would send a signal to the Chinese busi-
ness and banking community that this is an important area for
cooperation. 64 It is evident that fundamental institutional re-
forms are required, without which the impact of any legal re-
forms will be greatly diminished; but both are needed to bring
about further improvements in the system.
B. Legal Reforms
There are a number of more substantive legal reforms that
could be beneficial. 265 Firstly, clear guidelines for ex parte com-
munications to stress the importance of judicial independence
would help minimize any propensity for corruption and level the
playing field for foreign parties. 26 6 Laws should also be passed
on fraudulent transfers, and the law on piercing the corporate
veil improved, although they will only be effective alongside
structural reforms that improve the system's efficacy.267
1. Ad Hoc Awards?
Ultimately, more clarity is needed from the SPC on many of
their existing interpretations and laws, especially on the poten-
261. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
262. See generally Clarke, supra note 30.
263. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
264. See id.
265. Cf Peerenboom, supra note 159 (discussing the importance of institutional
reform for effective change).
266. See Lin, supra note 141, at 296 (discussing the role of ex parte hearings).
267. See generally Bradley C. Reed, Clearing Away the Mist: Suggestions for Developing a
Principled Veil Piercing Doctrine in China, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1643 (2006) (criticiz-
ing the current veil piercing statute enactedJanuary 2006 as too ambiguous to be useful
in a civil law system demanding specificity).
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tial applicability of the 1995 reporting notice to foreign-related
and ad hoc arbitral awards. 268 Given the increased use of ad hoc
tribunals both within and outside China, all current and future
rules should apply to their awards equally.26 9 For as long as
these reporting mechanisms play a role in monitoring enforce-
ment levels, they should be kept as broad in application as they
effectively can be.2 7 °
2. Expansion of the Reporting Mechanisms 271
The reporting mechanisms for refusal to enforce or setting
aside awards would be significantly strengthened if those cases
denied enforcement or set aside by the SPC were to be pub-
lished, incorporating the benefits and discipline of the practice
of case reporting.272 A centrally published report would help to
better promote rigorous legal reasoning and standards of legal
interpretation.273 Such a publication would contain basic infor-
mation about the case and the legal reasoning behind the re-
fusal of enforcement, setting aside, or annulment; sufficient only
to provide for an understanding of the procedural elements of
the case.274 To promote uniformity, as long as WFOEs and FJVs
are subject to compulsory Chinese jurisdiction, any such publica-
tion should cover domestic awards as well as Convention and for-
eign-related arbitral awards, perhaps just for awards over a cer-
tain specified financial value.275
This information would serve as a useful guide for judges
268. See Peerenboom, supra note 25, at 26.
269. Id.
270. See generally Clarke, supra note 30.
271. See 1995 Reporting Notice, supra note 108; Jurisdictions, supra note 129.
272. See Lin, supra note 141, at 299-311. There has been much discussion in China
over recent years on the merits of adopting stare decisis. That, according to the Author,
now is likely. See generally Bernadette Meyler, Towards A Common Law Originalism, 59
STAN. L. Rv. 551, 588 (2006) (outlining the benefits of case reporting attributed to Sir
Edward Coke in the nineteen century: "The reporting of particular Cases or Examples
is the most perspicuous course of teaching, the right rule and reason of the law; for so
did Almighty God himself, when he delivered by Moses hisJudicial Laws, Exemplis docuit
pro Legbus .... ).
273. See Lin, supra note 141, at 296-97 (outlining The People's University Professor
Wang Liming's recommendations for structural reforms addressing judicial indepen-
dence, including public rendering of explicit legal opinions).
274. Id. at 309-10, (some pioneering Courts have started to publish opinions, in-
cluding dissents).
275. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (noting trifurcated classification
of awards).
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across the country to encourage consistency and perhaps even
predictability. 276 In a judiciary increasingly incentivized to per-
form well, it would serve to induce greater standards of profes-
sionalism throughout the system. 7 It would also provide empir-
ical data on the rates of enforcement, allowing greater scrutiny
and promoting system efficiency. 27
3. Public Policy v. Public Interest
As a matter of priority, the discrepancy between the Con-
vention's "public policy" and "public interest" for foreign-related
and domestic awards should be clarified in favor of the Conven-
tion's international standard.279 Doing so would create an inter-
national benchmark for Chinese courts to apply, minimizing
protectionist influences, especially in the enforcement of domes-
tic awards that are not subject to the SPC reporting mechanism
for enforcement. 2 °
4. Domestic v. Foreign-related Awards
Similarly, the disparity in the scope of review of domestic
versus foreign-related and Convention awards should be elimi-
nated, bringing it into line with the international standards
under the New York Convention. 21l As China transitions to a
market-based economy, it requires an appropriate set of corre-
sponding legal institutions, the most important characteristic of
which is general applicability.28 2 As Clarke suggests, laws must
apply uniformly to large numbers of economic actors or "the sys-
tem will revert to the kind of specific directive and ad hoc bar-
gaining whose inadequacies led to the drive for reform in the
first place. '2 3 When the Arbitration Law was first drafted there
was reportedly debate whether to standardize the laws or to cre-
276. See supra note 272 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of reporting).
277. See Lin, supra note 141, at 309-10 (hypothesizing on the positive effect that
public scrutiny reporting might afford on the quality of judicial reasoning). See also
Judges Law of the P.R.C., art. 1.
278. See Peerenboom, supra note 159, at 256-57; see also Clarke, supra note 30 (not-
ing the depth of the problem cannot be measured with precision due to the unavailabil-
ity of statistical data).
279. See Zhou, supra note 20, at 448-49.
280. See 1995 Reporting Notice, supra note 108.
281. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
282. See Clarke, supra note 30, at 4.
283. Id.
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ate two separate systems.284 It was decided to opt for two separate
systems at that time. It is now time to revisit that debate.285
5. Foreign Investors as "Domestic" Party
At the very least, international investors treated as WFOEs and
JVs should be able to benefit from the laws on foreign-related
arbitration. 86 Subjecting them to the domestic laws and proce-
dures exposes them to an unnecessary risk.2 8 7 Further subject-
ing them to the mercy of de novo review by the courts frustrates
the very point of arbitration, let alone an arbitral award.288 As
the number of affected international parties rises, the effect on
China's reputation both for foreign investment and interna-
tional arbitration will be exponential.289
V. GREAT EXPECTATIONS
Reliable, meaningful, comparable empirical data on the
current rate of enforcement of arbitral awards in China is notori-
ously difficult to obtain.290 According to an Arbitration Re-
search Institute ("ARI") survey in 1997, seventy-seven percent of
CIETAC awards and seventy-one percent of foreign awards were
enforced.29 1 A subsequent study criticizes the methodology be-
hind these ARI figures, not least because they do not differenti-
ate between instances in which the award was fully satisfied or
only partially satisfied. 292 Yet, so severe is the lack of reliable sta-
tistics that Peerenboom heavily caveats his own methodology.
293
Notwithstanding such caution, Professor Peerenboom esti-
mates the success rate for foreign applicants at forty-nine per-
cent, slightly higher than that achieved for P.R.C. applicants at
284. See Luo, supra note 12, 87-88 (argument for two separate systems was sup-
ported by the different foundations of the two types of arbitration and certain peculiari-
ties of disputes involving foreign elements).
285. Id.
286. See Zhou, supra note 20, at 454-55.
287. Id. (criticizing compulsory domestic jurisdiction).
288. Id.
289. See id.
290. See supra note 278 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty of obtaining
reliable empirical data).
291. See Peerenboom, supra note 159, at 267.
292. See id.
293. See id.
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an estimated forty-three percent.294 The enforcement rate for
foreign awards was fifty-two percent, slightly higher than the
forty-seven percent success rate for CIETAC awards. 295 This is
comparable to the estimated rate of enforcement for civil judge-
ments generally, which vary from eighty to fifty percent.
296
It is interesting to see how this compares with enforcement
rates in the United States, where reliable data is also hard to
come by.297 The U.S. Courts do not suffer from the same nega-
tive press, and U.S. enforcement rates do "not generate anything
approaching the cries of alarm heard in China."298 Still, based
on available surveys, levels of enforcement of civil economic
judgments in the United States and in England and Wales are
also far from ideal and, indeed, may be equivalent to or even
lower than the rate of enforcement in China.2 99 It is quite possi-
ble that the American and English business communities toler-
ate domestic enforcement rates that the Chinese legal commu-
nity would consider shockingly low.3"'
So, if China's enforcement rates are comparatively reasona-
ble, why is its reputation in this area so bad? Firstly, as discussed
supra,30 ' there is a lack of statistics with which to defend the sys-
tem. °2 As a result, we do not hear about the successes. There
remains a strong preference for mediation in a legal culture that
focuses on consensus and dislikes finality that disfavors the effi-
294. See id. at 279.
295. See id. at 254.
296. See Clarke, supra note 30, at 28. Discussing the range and sources of available
statistics. These figures are impossible to confirm or deny. See Chunying, supra note
176, at 61 (in some provinces, nearly eighty percent of the court judgments in eco-
nomic and civil cases are not enforced or incompletely enforced).
297. See Clarke, supra note 30, at 33-34.
298. See id.
299. See id. (citing Committee on Post-Judgment Collection Procedures in the Spe-
cial Civil Park, Report to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, N.J.L.J., Nov. 1, 1993, at 2). In the
eleven New Jersey counties surveyed in 1987, only twenty-five percent of cases were
returned fully satisfied, seven percent practically satisfied and the remaining sixty-eight
percent were returned unsatisfied. See also John Baldwin & Ralph Cunnington, The
Crisis in Enforcement of CivilJudgments in England and Wales, 2004 PUBLIC LAw 305 (citing
the results of empirical studies in England and Wales indicating the level of enforce-
ment of civil judgments is similarly poor; fewer defendants against whom civil judg-
ments are registered respect them than honor them).
300. See Baldwin & Cunnington, supra note 299, at 305
301. See id. at 292
302. See Peerenboom, supra note 159, at 256-57 (showing that the difficulties and
caveats in Peerenboom's empirical study illustrate the difficulty to get reliable data).
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cacy of its own court system.3 °3 Given this cultural propensity to
avoid confrontation, a disproportionately large number of
awards are most likely satisfied consensually, at least partially.
304
Such settlements would be occuring under the judicial radar and
would not be reflected in any available statistics.30 5
Secondly, those cases that resort to enforcement actions in
court are only those that are contested or resisted. °6 Given the
cultural backdrop, the parties probably resort to judicial inter-
vention more reluctantly than in the West, where adversarial en-
forcement actions do not have such negative connotations, and
have not been subject to strong cultural influences to settle con-
sensually.30 7 Even the most reasonable and informed Western
expectations are likely to be disappointed by the reality of litiga-
tion at this late stage in the dispute resolution process, especially
before a weak judiciary held hostage to local protectionism and
corruption.
The frustration and confusion of the resulting outcomes re-
sults in the negative headlines of Western media. Such head-
lines both simplify and amplify the extent of the problem. They
necessarily focus on a few high-profile, egregious cases involving
surprised and frustrated foreign parties. Even with good legal
advice and thorough due diligence, Western parties can fall prey
to unrealistic expectations of the culture they are investing into
and its mechanisms for resolving disputes with domestic par-
ties.30 ' China's pledge to improve its legal system on joining the
WTO has increased foreign expectations of the system: "We
were hoping that now it had entered the W.T.O., China would
be more interested in showing how private disputes can be re-
303. See de Vera, supra note 10, at 162-64 (mentioning the culture and judicial
recognition of mediation).
304. See Peerenboom, supra note 159, at 256-57.
305. Even in Western jurisdictions, a high number of awards are satisfied by settle-
ment. See generally, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, INTERNArIONAL ARBITRATION: COR-
PoRATE ATrITUDES AND PRACTICEs 2006, available at http://www.pwc.com/arbitraion-
study.
306. See Arbitration Law, supra note 9, art. 62.
307. See generally de Vera, supra note 10.
308. See Jay Hoenig, Managing Business Risks: Wise Companies Prepare For-and Mini-
mize Their Exposure To--Risks When Investing in China, CHINA Bus. REv. (Nov. 1, 2006),
available at http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/0611/hoenig.htmi (discuss-
ing, inter alia, measures companies can take to identify and minimize regulatory risk in
China).
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solved," said one baffled CEO to the Los Angeles Times. 30 9 His
company invested in 2001, one year after China joined the
W.T.O., and was embroiled in typically frustrating arbitration
proceedings a few years later. PepsiCo, like other large multina-
tionals, seems to have been surprised to find no easy exit one
year after it first sought to extract itself from a troublesome joint
venture and got involved in a subsequent legal dispute. 1l
Such bad publicity, however, does not yet seem to be deter-
ring eager outside investors.3 1  Even in some of the more severe
cases, companies still cannot resist being in China: "China is too
big for [foreign companies] to ignore. ' 12 In spite of the legal
uncertainty and its climate of corruption and protectionism,
China remains the most popular destination for foreign direct
investment, 313 with levels expected to rise until at least the end
of the decade. 14 Such statistics raise the question of whether
this phenomenon with arbitration awards indicates that China
may be an exception to the general correlation between the rule
of law and FDI." 5
Some commentators suggest that cultural factors reflecting
an emphasis on relationships could be an adequate substitute for
a rule of law. These factors include a distinct form of "Chinese
309. See Evelyn Iritani, A Local Firm's Baffling Trip Through China's Arbitration System,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2003.
310. See Andrew Batson, Pepsico Finds No Easy Exit from Troubled China Venture, Dow
JONES NEWS, Aug. 14, 2003.
311. See, e.g., id.; see also Iritani, supra note 309. None of the foreign companies
mentioned in the examples in this study had any intention of withdrawing from the
Chinese market.
312. See Iritani, supra note 309 (noting that attorneys for U.S. investment firms
operating in China endure extensive arbitration proceedings in China).
313. See UNCTAD, supra note 4 (discussing China as the most popular destination
for capital).
314. See Faintly Declining Investment, ECONOMIST, Oct. 27, 2006. China attracted
over US$60 billion in foreign direct investment in both 2005 and 2004. In the first
quarter of 2006, FDI rose 6.4 percent to US$14 billion, more than any other developing
country. The ECONOMIST Intelligence Unit forecasts continuing growth in foreign di-
rect investment to the end of the decade after slight declinesin 2005 and 2006, albeit at
a diminishing rate. Id.
315. See generally Jan Hoogmarten, Can China's Socialist Market Survive WO Acces-
sion? Politics, Market Economy and Rule of Law, 7 SPG L. & Bus. REv. Am. 37 (2001)
("Establishing the Rule of Law is another hurdle to be taken by a transition economy
like China to support the underlying principles of the WTO."). On the rule of law in
China more generally, see Clarke, supra note 30; Lin, supra note 141; Lubman, supra
note 233; Randall Peerenboom, Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom, One Hundred Schools Con-
tend: Debating Rule of Law in China, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 471 (2002).
2007] 1355
1356 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 30:1318
capitalism," a guanxi-based rule of relationships, 6 clientism and
corporatism.317 Peerenboom's empirical study, however, found
that outside of insolvency, non-enforcement was due to local
protectionism, weak courts, corruption, and shortcomings in the
regulatory framework.3 18 These are obstacles to enforcement
that the proposed relation-based alternative to the rule of law
would merely exacerbate. The most effective remedy is a greater
emphasis on the rule of law including, but not limited to, institu-
tional changes to strengthen the legal system.319
Enforcement of arbitral awards is an issue that the legal sys-
tem of any growing economy relying on private investment must
confront, sooner or later, for sustained success.32 ° It is, however,
an issue that is only confronted by parties when commercial
agreements go sour.321  During the recent years of China's
booming economy, this has not happened on a large scale. The
real test of the system will come if, and when, foreign invest-
ments start to unwind.322 Inevitably, at least some foreign parties
will have been caught up in the rush to get a foothold in China:
"[I] n China you have to be three times as careful."323 Few com-
panies are likely to have completed the due diligence necessary
to help ensure obligations and expectations will be met.3 24
As a result, unless China can institute reforms that will help
meet international standards, cases such as these will become far
more commonplace. Unrealistic expectations, however, could
undermine the policy of Western commercial and State actors
towards China. 25 What is a reasonable level of enforcement to
316. See John H. Matheson, Convergence, Culture and Contract Law in China, 15
MINN. J. INT'L L. 329, 374 (2006) ("Often viewed by outsiders, including American busi-
ness investors, as a corrupted system of cronyism and bribery, guanxi suggests relation-
ships that include mutual obligation, reciprocity, goodwill, and personal affection.").
317. See Peerenboom, supra note 159, at 313.
318. Id. at 314.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 284 (noting importance of effective arbitration award enforcement).
321. See Arbitration Law, supra note 9, art. 62. To end up in the courts, the parties
will have failed at all mediation attempts, and the respondent will either refuse or be
unable to satisfy the award.
322. See generally Peerenboom, supra note 159 (stating that insolvency is the most
frequent obstacle to enforcement).
323. Id. (general counsel of U.S. fast-food franchise on due diligence require-
ments in China).
324. See Loomis, supra note 206.
325. Stanley Lubman, There's No Rushing China's Slow March to a Rule of Law, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 1997.
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expect, and how can it be determined? Resorting to quantitative
measurements, although useful, is a somewhat academic exer-
cise, especially considering the acute cultural preference for set-
tlement earlier in the process. 26 It is crucial that China be seen
as taking steps to improve its reputation for enforcing awards to
bring its practice in line with international norms.
The Constitution of the P.R.C. itself acknowledges, "the fu-
ture of China is closely linked with that of the whole world.
'3 27
Its commercial interests are now closely aligned with those of the
international business community.3 28 In turn, arbitration's role
in international commerce is firmly established, yet its legitimacy
clearly relies on the enforceability of the awards it yields.329 It is
important for the stability and sustainability of China's economic
and social expansion that it be able to provide a reliable forum,
not only for resolving China-related disputes, but also to ensure
that resulting awards are worth the paper they are printed on.3
Increased international commercial activity may also encourage
considerations of reciprocity within the Chinese legal system as
China itself turns to overseas courts to resolve its disputes. 3
In addition to the legal reforms outlined above, actions of
high-ranking officials indicate that China seems to be on a
charm offensive. The public image desired by the Chinese
courts is one of competence in handling cases involving foreign
elements fairly and justly.33 2 Knowing the eyes of the world are
watching, the SPC has repeatedly asked all courts to exercise ju-
risdiction over cases involving foreign elements in strict accor-
326. See Clarke, supra note 30, at 33. As Clarke discusses, "we do not know how
much execution would constitute a good rate. The social marginal cost of one hundred
percentenforcement is probably not worth it." Id.
327. Xian Fa [Contitution], pmbl. (1982) (P.R.C.) available at http://en-
glish.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (last updated Mar. 22, 2004).
328. See UNCTAD, supra note 4. Given the unprecedented levels of foreign invest-
ment in China and the importance of WTO membership and foreign direct investment.
329. See Price Waterhouse Coopers, supra note 305, at 33. A recent global empiri-
cal study on corporate attitudes and arbitration practices found seventy-hree percent
of corporations preferred arbitration to litigation to resolve cross border disputes. En-
forceability of awards was the second most important reason (behind procedural flexi-
bility) for preferring international arbitration to transnational litigation.
330. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
331. See Feinerman, supra note 180, at 195 (consideration of reciprocity increas-
ingly affecting Chinese courts).
332. See, e.g., An Chen, supra note 18; Anderlini, supra note 232.
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dance with existing law, treaty, and private agreement.3 33 In Oc-
tober 2006, the Chairman of China Council for the Promotion
of International Trade ("CCPIT"), claimed, "China's arbitration
results have gained high credit globally," pointing to more than
10,000 cases submitted to arbitration in China over the past five
decades.334
Public relations, however, work both ways. The most effec-
tive tool for enforcement, despite the availability of court orders
and enforcement police, was found to be the naming of the of-
fending respondent in the local newspaper.335 The resulting loss
of "mianzi," or face, is a source of great sensitivity in Chinese
psychology.336 This concept can be easily extrapolated from the
individual to the international dimension. It could be that the
negative press generated by such high-profile multi-national dis-
putes consciously or otherwise induces specific outcomes within
the Chinese legal system. 3 7 Even more broadly, the loss of mi-
anzi caused by these infamous cases of poor enforcement could
be playing a key role, alongside the economic incentive, in in-
ducing China to reform and implement the necessary institu-
tional changes.3 8
There is a lot at stake. As a WTO member, China is under
an obligation, inter alia, to provide for uniform enforcement of
law and a transparent adjudication process.3 39 Should China fail
to live up to these promises, it could rapidly lose credibility with
333. See Notice of the Sup. People's Ct. on Issuing the Basic Code of Professional
Ethics forJudges of the P.R.C. (promulgated by the SPC on Oct. 18, 2001), translated in
ISINOLAW (last visited Feb. 18, 2006) (P.R.C.); see also Zhang, supra note 171, at 62-63
(citing Li Guoguang, Vice-President of the Supreme People's Court, Several Policy Issues
Concerning the Current Trials in Civil Cases (Speech at the National Conference of Civil
Trials, Oct. 28, 2000)).
334. China's Arbitrations on Trade Disputes, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 19, 2006,
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/20O6-10/19/content_711818.htm.
335. See Peerenboom, supra note 159, at 295.
336. Echo Shan, "Mianzi" of Chinese Weighs a Lot, Comes at a Price, CHINA DAILY (ON-
LINE), Aug. 8, 2005, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-08/08/content_
467216.htm (last viewed Feb. 10, 2007). In a survey of 1150 Chinese youths, ninety-
three percent said they pay a lot of attention to their mianzi (people's decency, person-
ality, and dignity). Public gaffes were the most humiliating, followed by the perception
of failing to fulfill one's promise.
337. Id. This could be a result of internal political pressure out of concern for
international reputation, or the result of an individual's mianzi.
338. Id. Conversely, it could also have been behind its sustained reluctance to
admit there is a problem.
339. See Hoogmarten, supra note 315.
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its trading partners and be precluded from international mecha-
nisms for settling disputes.34 °
CONCLUSION
While the negative hype surrounding the recognition and
enforcement of arbitration awards in China is not unfounded, it
is also not proportionate. That is not to say that the interna-
tional investors should adjust their expectations downwards, nor
acquiesce to the status quo. This study merely aims to put
China's bad reputation for enforcing awards in the context of a
cultural and legal clash between an infant legal system that is
slowly reforming and Western-style expectations of justice.
The central government is clearly conscious of the problem
at all levels, and the SPC has provided some increasingly useful,
if not comprehensive, interpretations. Overall, China is per-
ceived to have made significant and encouraging progress in re-
cent years.34' As the volume and magnitude of arbitration
awards increases in line with economic activity, it is increasingly
important that China be perceived as a reliable jurisdiction for
enforcing arbitration awards, both by foreign and Chinese busi-
nesses. To achieve this, there is no clear alternative to promot-
ing the rule of law and bringing about institutional change.
Arbitration, however, is a Western import that brings with it
foreign principles of adversarial adjudication, impartiality, trans-
parency and finality. The necessary cultural adjustment will not
take place overnight, and the process will not be forced by exter-
nal pressure, especially from the West. To expect China to have
made the transition in the time it took to sign on the dotted line
at the WTO, and to judge it accordingly, merely frustrates those
international parties who seek to gain from its new trading sta-
tus. If arbitration really is the "Chinese legal netherworld," at
the very least, it is finding its map.
340. See Lin, supra note 141, at 298-99 (quoting Professor Mi Jian, Deputy Chief
Justice of the Qinghai Provincial High Court).
341. See generally P.R. C. Arbitration Law; Clarification from the P.R. C. Supreme People's
Court, FRESHFIELDS BRUCK-AUS DERINGER, Sept. 2006, available at http://www.fresh
fields.com/publications/pdfs/2006/16296.pdf; see also Anderlini, supra note 232.
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